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The Money Gains Podcast
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The Money Gains Podcast
Could You Run the UK Economy? Inside the Decisions No One Sees (Joe Mayes)
There's more to the Budget than the headlines.
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In this episode of the Money Gains Podcast we welcome award-winning journalist and bestselling author Joe Mayes to the show.
We discussed the intense pressures faced by the Chancellor, why there's so much uncertainty about economic policies and ran through some interactive scenarios from Joe's book, Can You Run the Economy?
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Can You Run The Economy? on Amazon https://amzn.eu/d/67ADU4l
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✅ Why Rachel Reeves raised taxes despite having a £4 billion surplus
✅ How the budget front-loads spending benefits whilst back-loading tax increases
✅ Why every chancellor faces impossible choices between bad and worse options
✅ How financial markets can force a chancellor from office immediately
✅ Why learning to think like a chancellor makes you better with your own money
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Welcome back to the Money Games Podcast. Joe Mays is a best-selling author of Can You Run the Economy and an award-winning reporter at Bloomberg News covering UK politics and the Treasury. And we're going to be tucking into the latest UK budget today and actually some scenarios and some games about whether you could actually be the Chancellor and run the economy. Joe, how are you doing, man?
Speaker 1:I'm very well, thank you. Yeah, thank you for having me here.
Speaker:Yeah, I'm, as I say, I probably, I know I always say this, but I am actually super excited. Great. Like the book is so cool, man. And it's just a bit different, right?
Speaker 1:Yeah, um, that's very clear of you to say. I mean, it's an interactive choose your own adventure book, a bit like the ones you might have had when you were a kid. And it's, you know, turn to page five if you want to take this decision, turn to page seven if you want to go a different way. And no, the aim was to bring this subject to life and make politics and economics fun, interesting, accessible to might be new to the area. And uh yeah, you get to be chancellor and you have to try and win an election without crashing the markets, crashing the economy. And uh, yeah, hopefully it's fun.
Speaker:Oh, wicked. Well, we're gonna tuck into that today. But obviously, you know, you've been following the Treasury for years and doing, you know, you've been across the Times, I believe, is that right? And Bloomberg now, and so you've kind of got insights about what's been happening for a long, long time. How did the latest budget land for you, and both sort of politically and economically as well, do you think?
Speaker 1:Yeah, I think politically what landed well, I think, to some extent, especially with Labour MPs, was the scrapping of the two child benefit cap. I think that's many Labour politicians came into politics to do that kind of thing, have a government measure which lifts children out of poverty. But the flip side being that that measure was seen as unpopular in many ranks of the public, because there's this perception that what the government has done is raise taxes on people to spend on welfare. And that's not the best look ever. So politically, I think a slightly tricky one for the government at a time where Rachel Reeves and Kirstarma are really quite unpopular, as polling shows. And on the economics of it, I mean, really what was difficult was that Rachel Reeves had to raise taxes in a pretty significant way with this freezing of income tax thresholds, despite saying that she wasn't going to increase taxes on working people in the manifesto, and at the budget last year saying, I won't be coming back for more in taxation. So that was always a difficult economic sell they would have to do. And I mean, the reason why Reeves did it was to actually restore some stability into the public finances, having been running it really quite tight. And then obviously we had this controversy over around downgrades to the economic forecast that she'd received. And she did get a big hit from the Office for Budget Responsibility, but that was outweighed by some better forecasts on the economy. Um but she still needed to raise some taxes to stabilize her position. I think what was interesting was that she didn't really make a huge effort at explaining that part of the move, like why she had to stabilize the finances, what the benefits of doing so were. So that surprised me slightly.
Speaker:There was some press that came out off the back of it that showed that there wasn't such a big gap in the public finances, but she still raised taxes, and that's caused a few stirs, right?
Speaker 1:Yeah. So in the press conference that she gave on November 4th, she made it sound like there was a big hole in the public finances, and therefore she needed to raise taxes to fill that hole. But obviously, we then learned from the forecasts that were the published by the OBR that she actually was in a £4 billion surplus when she made that press conference. Now, that £40 billion surplus is still not good, right? It's still down from where she was at the last budget, which was a £9 billion surplus. So she had money to make up, and she wanted to go beyond £9 billion to like a £20 billion surplus, which is the hist around the historic average that chancellors have given themselves. The reason why you have these surpluses is because if things go badly in the world economy, if you're hit by some kind of shock, you want to have a buffer, like a safety margin in the public finances that can take the hit on that. And so she wanted to get that buffer up, right? She was at 9 billion at her last budget, she'd be gone down to four according to the ABR forecasts, and now she's back up at 20, which is a better place to be. But notice how I don't think you've ever heard Rachel Reeves really explain that to the public. And so instead, what happened at that press conference was kind of say, I need to raise taxes because of a big hole. And really, there wasn't a big hole, there was a slight downgrade compared to where she was at last budget. So that that that surprised me. I actually think that the Chancellor could explain with clarity the need for some buffer, some kind of what they call it headroom, they call it a margin for error in the public finances. And people would get that. They get, yeah, I understand the idea that you need to have like a decent rainy day fund.
Speaker:Yeah, emergency fund, right? For sure, for sure.
Speaker 1:Um but that was never the communication strategy of the Treasury. It was more effectively, can we find a bogeyman to blame for the need to raise taxes? And effectively that was pushed through the line of how Brexit and the management of the economy by the Conservative Party in the austerity years had led to a poor productivity performance. Now, clearly, that was part of the picture of why the public finances weren't as good as they could have been at this budget. But as as we've seen, you know, it was equaled out by some improvement in the forecast from UBR.
Speaker:Yeah, no, you you're completely right. And you know, it is true though, like I think the communication around that f is what people most people have struggled with, like from the outside perspective perception of, say, the public as well. I would love to know from you, like, what do you feel like the public missed about the budget that perhaps was say the real story behind it? Like, what was that real thing that people have grasped upon, but perhaps they've missed the point, do you think?
Speaker 1:I think that something very interesting that happened is that a lot of the spending that the government did and the help to the public is front-loaded kind of now and in the year and year to come. So the help on energy bills, the help on railfares, prescription, cost of living is all kind of immediate. But then the tax increases are meant to come in in a few years' time, whether the freezing of the threshold. So it's kind of the slightly lopsided budget. Now, I guess that's good for the public in one sense in that you're getting that immediate benefit and you won't feel the tax hit until later. But for investors in financial markets, they look at that and they say, hmm, how credible is that? That you're kind of spending money now and you're doing most of the heavy lifting on the taxes later. And it has been noticed by markets. And I know that the Chancellor did want to see a strong positive reaction from markets following the budget because the UK has some of the highest borrowing costs amongst G7 countries, higher than France, higher than Germany. And that hurts the Chancellor now because it means that she's spending enormous sums of money on debt interest. That could be money spent on roads, schools, hospitals. So she was trying to get those borrowing costs down. And what happened after the budget? There was a slight positive rally in markets, but since then, not much has happened. So she's still kind of where she was. So she hasn't managed to kind of wow the markets into giving her much lower borrowing costs. And I think part of the reason why is because of that lopsided nature of what she did of spending now, most of the tax height later. It wasn't the kind of uh kind of big Razmatazz, wow, we are stunned by that budget, it was the markets could have seen.
Speaker:Yeah, absolutely. And it's a tough time for them in the polls, like they're they're not doing well. And but as we know, that can change within an instant and things can can go the other way. But you are right, like it did feel like a lot was being front-loaded. And then at the back end, it's like, well, actually, things like salary sacrifice, things like changes to cash ISIS, um, and you know, some things are like 2027, 2029, and then they don't even yet know how they're going to deliver those. Like there's consultation fees, there's all of these aspects that they have to be putting in place, and they still can't say how much actually that's, you know, it's a very much one of those of how much that's going to generate on tax take.
Speaker 1:Yeah, and I think that the key thing to say here is that we have a budget every year, right? So at next year's budget, or indeed the year after, if Rachel Reeves suddenly has much better forecasts for the economy on growth, she may well not end up facing the thresholds. They might go up. She might be able to say, because things have improved, because my numbers are now better, I can now afford not to do that. And she'd probably say at the time, I'm now cutting taxes on working people, kind of delivering on the labor promise. It'd be like we've done we've done a roller coaster, right? But that I think that's indeed her hope. When you've seen her in interviews, she's been saying things like the the cost of living help comes now, and she always says the taxing comes in 2028 onwards. And when she says that, it's almost like nodding a wink, it might not actually happen, right? Because I mean that's that's the the read I get from her. And when you're Chancellor, you know, you get you get a chance every year to make the big tax and spending decisions, and you respond to the forecast at the time. So could be better numbers next year and the year after. So it might not happen.
Speaker:Yeah, no, absolutely. I think it's like it's interesting because for me, you've watched this kind of shift in trust with politicians happen very much since sort of Boris and the NHS claims. I think that that was like the real fundamental big start of this sort of relationship between voters and politicians. Um, why do you, in your opinion, obviously you're seeing a lot of this, you've got your your finger on the pulse. Why do you think the public is finding it harder than ever to kind of relate and trust these kind of political decisions which are being made for them?
Speaker 1:Yeah, I think that we went through a really kind of significant period with uh the pandemic and then obviously the party gate scandal. And that went on for you know really some time, and it was for me a moment where yeah, it felt like the government was not being truthful with us, and we had kind of endless inquiries, reports until the truth finally came out, and it was clear that no number 10 had not been telling us about the the nature and the full scale of party gate. And then yeah, and that I think that hurt in terms of trust in the public. And since then it's it hasn't really recovered, I don't feel, and I think that the extent to which many people now get political information through social media is extensive, but it means that the capacity for critique and kind of uh opposing views, I suppose. Opposing views and indeed kind of analysis and what I'm saying is basically that the ability for politicians and people to get unfiltered messages through to you is like diminished in that world where there's just such a charged environment of commentary and opinion around political information that I think that also adds to the sense of skepticism and so on. And politicians have to deal with that.
Speaker:Yeah, no, actually, that's a very good point because you you're right, like it is supercharged right now. I I mean I looked at pre-budget, obviously, with the uh you know the leak that happened was you know laughable in some ways, just the way things have been going. But there was literally people on social media delivering the budget speech pre the Chancellor even giving it, and then post that enormous volumes of commentary. So we stayed away from it on the day because like we I don't get involved with news as much as I I'd like to on the day while things are happening. I like to digest and then give a you know an opinion around these things and invite guests like yourself on to comment around this thing's like, okay, we've had a moment, now let's talk about it, because that's a much more considered approach. But I I can only imagine how the like you know Labour press office must have been on that day. It must have been wild. Um and safe to say, like, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as you know from writing this book, is an extremely tough role in any environment. Um and I'd love to know from you, you've obviously spoken to many, many a Chancellor. Um what do you think is something that the public don't understand about the depths of the role of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? And by depths you mean Well, the sheer volume like how much they actually do, perhaps versus in relation to what the public perceive them to be doing.
Speaker 1:Sure. Um I think there's like two very intense parts of being Chancellor. One is that you're this huge public figure who has a diary that is absolutely frenetic and crazy, and you're meeting CEO one moment, then you're shaking hands with people over here, then you're going to accompany the prime minister on a trip over here. Like you are effectively almost like a CEO yourself with the intensity of demands on your time and so on. So there's that what you're doing. But then there's also this part of your role where you are intensely working with your officials, civil servants on policy. So you're trying to make sure that what the government is delivering, economic policy, is good. And that takes up an awful amount of time as well. And so you're relying on briefings from officials, you're having to set the direction, the strategy, policy on those areas. So doing those two things is very, very hard. And you're also a constituency MP, remember. So you have to get re-elected in your own seat. And for Rachel Reeves, that's up in the north, um, up in Leeds, sorry. So yeah, it's uh it's an absolutely mind-blowing job. You need uh exceptional management of your diary by chief of staff and so on. Yeah, it's it's it's super frenetic.
Speaker:I suppose it's safe to say that like similar to a CEO would rely on their leadership team, there's a lot of reliance on the core team that sits underneath Rachel Reeves or the Chancellor and For sure.
Speaker 1:So she has her team of Treasury ministers who all have responsibilities, if it's city minister, exchequer secretary, financial secretary to the treasury, who have their own policy areas. And then you'll have uh your special advisors, your media advisors, the chief of staff, economic advisors, a council of economic advisors. So yeah, you're you're running um a really important operation. You might say actually underpowered at the moment, given how important your role is. I think you know, in the United States, the officials and people have much larger staff than they have in the UK. We might learn from that. Um, but yeah, that's how it is.
Speaker:Yeah. How big is her team? Do you know, like roughly?
Speaker 1:Well, in terms of special advisors, you'd say kind of six or seven at most. Really wow. And then but then you've got the entire body of the treasury behind her. So you have the permanent secretary to the treasury, kind of the chief civil servant, you have deputy directors, you'll have, and then uh uh rank and file civil servants. You have like your kind of 20-somethings, the bright young things out of university who are doing a lot of the kind of policy work, grant work, and then above them, these deputy directors, and above those more senior directors up to the permanent secretary. So you're CEO of an organization in that sense. You know, you have you do have a big workforce behind you, but then you also have your kind of political close network of special advisors who help you day to day.
Speaker:I find it fascinating because we had Jack Leslie on senior economist at the Bank of England, and the sheer depths at the Bank of England go to just on basic decisions, is vast. And the scenarios that they play out, both you know, positive and negative, or if we introduced, if say this cost was to go up by X amount, where does the costs uh you know fall on the rest of the economy and how does that influence that? And then it the decisions that these guys are taking based on scenarios requires an enormous workforce to be able to kind of say, okay, we're gonna take this calculated risk based on what we're seeing in the data in front of us to essentially display it to the public who then have their own views as well. And it's it is it is quite fascinating, really.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I mean, I've brought my budget red box with me. As you see, this is like ministerial red box. And I brought this in partly because it's obviously a key thing that the Chancellor has. And when you're any government minister, you have to work through literally a physical box like that. There's also an online box nowadays as well, but it has stacks of papers in, all requiring decisions. You have advice from your officials saying, Should we do this? Should we do that? Minister, what do you decide? And you literally sign off what you want to do. And at the end of the day, a minister will work through their red box. And I interviewed Rachel Reeves for this book, and she told me that obviously it extends into the weekend as well, right? Your family life is significantly impacted by when you're a big public figure. Of course. And what was very interesting for me was that she told me at the weekend she has a binder, and in that binder, it has a hundred measures that she thinks would grow the British economy, or a hundred projects that are live and ongoing, and she works through them and wants updates on how did we do on progressing the construction of that bridge or working on that development or road. And often it works, means working with other departments. That was nothing that really struck me when she said so much of the growth mission this government is going about actually doesn't sit in the treasury. She doesn't have direct oversight of it. She's you know doing the public spending, she's doing the tax and spend. But then other ministers like housing department, environment, those are the people who can really unblock stuff that could actually help grow the economy. So I thought it was a very interesting, just insight from when I spoke to her.
Speaker:Right. So you mean like she's relying on, say, Minister for Transport to essentially deliver those projects, which has a drastic effect on growth, which is her email.
Speaker 1:Exactly. So she has to almost play like a coordinating role, I think, in government with those other departments. And the Treasury actually is small relative to other departments in terms of the number of officials it has. Philip Hammond, another chancellor interview for the book, just simply said uh the Treasury is small but has a lot of power. Like kind of power per person is very high in the Treasury because you're you know pulling the levers on the big tax and spend decisions. But you do need to work with the rest of Whitehall, the rest of government to make stuff happen.
Speaker:The sheer pressure of that role must be just enormous. Like it takes a certain type of individual to want to actually even take that on.
Speaker 1:Yeah, and I think uh especially the role of the Chancellor. And when I spoke to Chancellors for the book, Norman Lamont told me this. He said that you are the one politician around the cabinet table who cares about balancing the books. So all the other ministers are thinking about how do we get re-elected, what we should be spending money on. They don't really care about the public finances being imbalanced, and even the prime minister doesn't always care. I mean, historically you've seen tensions between chancellors and prime ministers where the prime minister says, like, why aren't we doing this? Why aren't we doing this? And the chancellor's like, well, we don't have the money, right? We just don't have the money. Yeah, we would love to, but we don't have the money. Um and indeed, so you have to yeah, uh Norman LeMont said you have to be ready to be unpopular with the public, but ready to be unpopular with your own MPs and indeed your own cabinet colleagues, who always think that, oh, if only we just made a little bit of uh creativity over here, we could spend the money needed to make that project happen, for example. So you have to be very ready to be unpopular and have a thick skin, especially as Chancellor.
Speaker:It's like a viper's nest, isn't it? Like there's with all of the ministers wanting to just basically take a little chunk out of you, or so because they have to get re-elected, or they've promised the public that they're going to deliver on the new bridge over at Dartford or whatever, you know, like and if they don't, well, and yeah, but the Chancellor's going, sorry. Well, and they're like, well, no, you need to make it happen. So she has to go out and figure out how and try and balance that because she can't have them turning on her as well. So there's like those political battles and fights that are happening too.
Speaker 1:Exactly. And there's this thing that happens, it's called the spending review. There's a chapter in the book on this where different ministers literally come into your office. I mean, the chief secretary of the treasury, who's the deputy of the chancellor, runs the process, but the chancellor's obviously heavily involved, and you literally directly bilaterally negotiate with ministers on how much money they can get, what project they can spend on. And it can be really testy slam doors, you know, like fights, you know, as you'd expect. So yeah, it's one of the hardest parts of government.
Speaker:Wow, like it's uh it is fascinating because I just think a lot of this kind of conversation and knowledge around this topic just goes unsaid. Like people see the headlines, they read the papers, and they go, oh geez, terrible, or you know, they throw a you know, a slander at them, or whatever that might all be. And you know, I'll be honest, I've been no I've certainly done that myself for certain decisions that the Chancellor has made over the course of many, many years. But behind it, they have to do something. Uh that's clear here. And like realistically, they're elected to that office with the sole growth, like with the sole goal of growing the economy. So it's not just like a like, oh yeah, no, we've decided to raise tax or we've decided to do this. It's weeks and weeks and months and months of like meetings and pressure and renegotiating and rebudgeting and reforecasting based on something which happens. And I think that that people should understand that and the kind of levels which go into sort of these decisions which the Chancellor makes. But In the book, um, you're making the readers do this. Yes. So they're like, this is what's cool. Yes. Uh it's it's one of the the only books I've ever seen out like this, which is like you're in charge. Yes. Yeah. Here's your big red briefcase. Yeah. Have fun and let's see how you get on. Yeah. Um obviously, one of the things we've mentioned a touch there is obviously party pressure. We've mentioned national debt, we've mentioned markets, a touch. But in real life, and something which you've been putting into the book, which of those forces do you think is actually the big one that they have to always get right?
Speaker 1:Yeah, so I think the answer to that, it all depends on timing. So public pressure is probably the most important thing if there is an election happening, you know, next week, right? You really care what the public think about you as the government at that point. So I'd say that. But then if it's say three years out, four years out from a general election, which is where we are now, public pressure is a lot less important because the voters can't kick you out at this point, right? Your MPs might be able to kick you out, that's another point, but the public can't. So you can, kind of during the middle of a parliament or early on, do stuff that's unpopular if you think that it will ultimately lead to good outcomes that might bear fruit down the line and so on. Now, markets, yeah, markets can really hurt you at any moment and can effectively force you from office immediately, as we saw in the Kwa Tang Trust case, right? Yes. So if you lose confidence of markets to the point where your debt costs are spiraling and it becomes a self-reinforcing thing where people start selling your debt and then the interest rates go up even more, and there's more, less, less, less, even less confidence, you can get to a very bad place very quickly. So yeah, I'd say that market stability has to always be a priority. And I guess to Reeves's credit, she has um done that. And indeed, at this budget, if you take a step back, ask yourself, what did she prioritize? Yeah, she prioritizes the markets by having that big increase in the fiscal headroom up to 20 billion pounds, as we talked about earlier. And she prioritized MPs to a certain extent with the lifting of the two child um benefit cap.
Speaker:Sound like a box-ticking exercise, didn't it, really, in this one, a lot of it.
Speaker 1:I mean, I think in terms of the audiences she was trying to satisfy, yeah, clearly, but the the the box that is financial markets is a very important box to tick, right? So I think like uh, you know, uh if she hadn't won that confidence in markets, the borrowing cost could have been worse. And that's like that really hurts her now.
Speaker:It's interesting though, because a lot of the party donors are sitting in two million pounds plus houses. And that must have hurt.
Speaker 1:Sure. Yeah, indeed. Um but again, I think she needed something to again keep the keep the MPs on side and the public. And the public and the public. I mean, you can't entirely ignore public. And indeed, if the public have turned against you so badly that the national polling is showing that your party's gonna get wiped out at the local elections or soon, that does factor in and the MPs see that polling and go, wait a second, have we got the right leadership structure here? And should we perhaps have a change of leader? And and that's where obviously the conversation has got to, and that is a direct threat to Reeves. So I think that my sense is that Reeves would have liked to have gone even further with the markets, you know, even more fiscal headroom, kind of really surprised them by how prudent and safe she's being with public finances. But it got to the point where they decided not to do that. And remember, there was talk of her increasing income tax, right? And that's what everyone thought was going to happen. Yeah with this idea that you'd increase income tax by 2p, cut 2p off national insurance, and then people pay more in tax if they're pensioners or rental income and so on. Um they dropped that plan, right? Why did they drop that plan? It just seems that a political decision was made that, okay, that would look the markets would like that, but the public really wouldn't. And it would look like we're really breaking the manifesto, so we can't afford to do that. That's ultimately what happened, right?
Speaker:The press went. The press, the public, for sure. It went wild when she when that came out. I was like, oh my god, this is just huge. Because it would have been a direct break of manifesto pledge, and then you're in big trouble in the public eye. Like those that that's very irreparable at that point, and I think they realized that and very much sort of changed it from there. But love to know, you interviewed Rachel, um Rachel Reese, the Chancellor, and many others. I'd love to know like what made like from speaking to these guys, it must have been clear that they're a certain type of individual. And like, what was the kind of experience that you took away that you sort of came from that those meetings? And obviously, you must have sort of condensed it and sort of rethought about it when you've gone, wow, that really struck me. And they were all very similar in this regard and perhaps not in that regard.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I mean, they're all very different characters, um, obviously very deep thinkers, very established, you know, commendable professional politicians, right? You know, you get that sense from them, who experienced something which not many of us do get to experience, was that intense wild pressure we've talked about, the balancing acts they were always doing between the economy and and the politics. So it was really just a great privilege to do those interviews. I mean, someone like Norman Lamont, who was the chancellor during the 1992 currency crisis, where you know Britain saw the pound being shorted massively, cost the country an awful lot of money, and he was the guy who was sat there in the treasury who had to decide what to do. I mean, can you imagine experiencing that? So to sit across from him and uh ask him about it was like just from a kind of basic uh like academia research point of view, an absolutely stunning experience. Indeed, someone's like Philip Hammond, who was Chancellor in the years after the Brexit vote. I mean, he had to try and give the UK a soft landing after the vote at a time where everyone was worried about their finances. What did it mean? You know, the pressure and things he must have seen, absolutely extraordinary. I mean, interviewing Quasi, what was it like to be quasi during the mini-budget crisis? Did you ask him? I did ask him about it. Yeah, it was. Oh wow. It was it was amazing.
Speaker:And he's coming on soon.
Speaker 1:Oh, great. Oh, I mean he will be a great guest, I'm sure. And I remember a memorable line from the interview with him, which was that he said, All I knew in Downing Street was chaos and panic, and I was very glad to leave. Like it kind of sums it up right what he went through. Um it was rapid, wasn't it? It was rapid for sure, yeah. And he told me he never actually moved into Downing Street. He he was living nearby in Greenwich, I think it was. Uh he never actually got to in that short-term.
Speaker:One night would have been lucky.
Speaker 1:I know, I know, but he's like, nah, I know I didn't even say that.
Speaker:So with that though, do you feel like there was anything that they did in that budget that actually may have ended up being a success? Because the markets, they just tanked the markets, didn't they? But that was the big problem.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I think Kawazi has a really interesting thought about it, which is that he thinks if they had gone about the package of measures slower, and indeed had some spending cuts in there. Because obviously, at the time it was a big package of tax cuts, it was seen as unfunded, all fueled by borrowing, and that's really spooked the markets. And also they'd fired the permanent secretary of the treasury, they hadn't done an OBR forecast. They'd really kind of bypassed all the usual mechanisms and measures. And his argument is maybe if we'd gone a lot slower, had the same kind of measures, but maybe some spending cuts in there, kind of acclimatized the markets to what we were about to do. He thinks it could have landed, it could have landed. Um, but just the execution of what they did was so rushed that it it obviously kind of exploded on impact. So I think that that's interesting. But I think the legacy of that whole moment is that it's really quite hard now for politicians of either mainstream party, even reform, to stand on a clear platform of cutting taxes and so on, because you instantly get labelled as being a quasi or a Liz truss. So yeah, I think they've done pretty long-term damage to that kind of economic approach, which you know might have some merit if done in the right way.
Speaker:I feel like it gave it gave the markets and the public, press, etc., a little bit more power in these and influence in those situations because of how abrupt and like damaging to the economy that was. And it just seems like now there's obviously amplified with social media, et cetera, from there. It feels like even more. And maybe I'm just living in it and like I so I see a lot more of it. But like it does feel like that.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I think uh as someone who obviously studied economics and like really enjoyed writing this book, it was kind of really interesting to live through almost like a scientific experiment of what happens when the government does something the bond market really doesn't like, like what actually happens in the real world, and we got to see it, right? And we hadn't really seen it for really quite some time. So it was kind of interesting, right? Like it was a fascinating period, especially as a journalist covering it. Wow. Like I learned a lot about debt and a lot I learn about borrowing cars with interest rates, and you know, whoa. Yeah, it was it was interesting from that perspective.
Speaker:Yeah, I can imagine. Now, you you've structured the book so readers and you know can really take this on. And I I would absolutely love to get started. Let's do it. Um can you walk us through some of the scenarios and can we can we play them out and listeners can have fun? Um it will work both on on audio and visual video as well.
Speaker 1:Brilliant. Okay, well, um Sammy, you're going to be the Chancellor. Does that sound okay? Are you ready to take the I am.
Speaker:I'll put my sort of red suit on the Rachel Reese's. Thank you. Thank you.
Speaker 1:Um Great. Well, welcome to the Treasury. Um it's a historic institution. There have been 800 years worth of chancellors, and you and other latest, so welcome. That's some pressure. Big shoes to fill. Big shoes to fill. Um I am afraid to say that in your appointments, while this has been going on, a crisis is happening outside these very doors.
Speaker:You're kidding.
Speaker 1:I'm not kidding. Alas, there is. Um I'm afraid to say one of Britain's largest companies is about to collapse. So this company employs tens of thousands of people across Britain. Indeed, many of them are employed in constituencies that you care about, and your political party has MPs. So your choice is really quite simple. This company will run out of funding tomorrow if it doesn't get a £1 billion bailout. A billion pounds. A billion pounds.
Speaker:Okay.
Speaker 1:So your first decision as Chancellor is going to be are you willing to bail this company out or not? And my final piece of context for you is that your starting position is £20 billion in the black. That's indeed where Rachel Reeves is right now with her budget surplus. So you have £20 billion to pay with as Chancellor, and this is your first decision. So Sammy, Chancellor, I need your decision right now. Are you gonna bail this company out or will you let it go bust? And tell me why.
Speaker:So I'm balancing the decision. There's a reason for me saying no, potentially, because it opens Pandora's box at that point. In my eyes, if you're bailing one out, what stops the next, the next, the next, and then suddenly you've started while you did them and not them. That's a wise thought. And so then suddenly you've got that issue at play. However, immediately MPs, backbenchers, the pressure on that side of the fence is quite growing. And if this is tens of thousands of jobs, then actually it's quite a detrimental effect to the economy. Second phase to that would be the tax take from those individuals' income tax pays, etc., plus tax take from that business. So then eventually so you've got that effect too. Um could it be a loan?
Speaker 1:No, it has to be a straight suspend. Straight bailout. Yeah, straight bailout.
Speaker:So because I'm feeling generous, I'm gonna say yes, but I feel really bad about it.
Speaker 1:Are you gonna say that in the media? I'm giving the money when I'm really bad about this.
Speaker:My gut is telling me to say no. I'm gonna say no. I'm gonna say no. I'm gonna say no. I'm gonna say no because we have a res I have a responsibility to the office to do the right thing, which is not to bail out companies which have got themselves into that position in the first place.
Speaker 1:Chancellor, thank you very much for your decision. It's been noted. I will inform the company and inform the markets of your of your decision. We're now gonna fast forward to the next day. The next day is here. Are you ready to hear what's happened uh in response to your decision? This is so much fun. Yeah, yeah. So uh the right-wing press is very impressed with your prudence and your sticking to sound moral principles, economic principles. However, the overall majority otherwise in the media are saying you're absent without leave as Chancellor, and your first decision you've let down all these employees. So I'm afraid to say, Chancellor, the headlines are looking pretty rough this morning.
Speaker:I thought they might.
Speaker 1:The polls have come through, immediate initial snap polling or decision, and they show an immediate hit to your popularity as Chancellor, I'm afraid to say. However, your economic advisor just walked into the room with a big smile on her face, and she is commending you for your decision and is telling you that that money is money that can otherwise be spent on things like roads, schools, hospitals, and the nation the nation will in future come to learn of how this was a very wise decision. Congratulations, Charles. That was your first scenario. Are you ready for another scenario? Oh my God.
Speaker:I'm sweating here.
Speaker 1:You've got to make about 10 more decisions.
Speaker:I can do that job. I don't know. Can I run the economy? No.
Speaker 1:Your book process, I was like, my sink of course I'm the real Chancellor. The tax take and income. Should we do one more scenario?
Speaker:Yeah, yeah, let's do it. That was great. That was really interesting.
Speaker 1:Scenario number two. So your economic advisor just left the room, and now your diary manager is telling you that there are two people waiting outside who'd like to see you. They're very important. They are the heads of Britain's two largest trade unions. Would you like to see them now? Yes. Good. That's the right answer. Because the trade unions will not like to be told no. Yeah, they have power. I'll bring them in. So um the two gentlemen here are called Charlie Marx, no relation to Karl Marx. Okay. And uh Freddie Angel, no relation to Friedrich Engels. And they are here with some very significant pay demands. So they are asking you, Chancellor, for a 10% increase in public sector pay, which, as you know, is well above where inflation currently stands. And they are saying to you that if you do not give them this public sector pay increase, there will be a general strike. That's to say there'll be a strike in all sectors of the economy where there are public servants, such as, for example, the police, schools, hospitals. Now, Chancellor, if you say yes to this request from the unions, it will cost you 10 billion pounds. If you say no, you can ask for further negotiations. So that is your your choice. I must tell you, the trade unions are telling me they do not want any more negotiations. They are done negotiating with you and this government and they are frankly ready to walk and deliver a general strike. So, Chancellor, are you going to accede to their request for a 10% pay rise? Public sector pay, or are you going to call for further negotiations?
Speaker:I don't need to think about this.
Speaker 1:Tell me.
Speaker:The reason being is you never accept the first deal. And the the they they know they've come in at 10%. It's the same when you do a salary increase. You say, Oh, I want 15, but really you're okay with seven and a half. Uh, it's exactly the same thing here. You we know actually public sector, large parts of the public sector have had increases above inflation rates at the moment. Therefore, a further increase actually could help hurt us even further in the rest of the public in the press. However, they you know, there are elements of the public service sector which are underpaid, in my view. So it's a tough one. Uh, if it was broken down per sector, say NHS, for example, nurses, etc., I would have probably I wouldn't necessarily have said 10% in this regard, but I definitely would have negotiated a lot a lot higher, other areas not so much. Um don't come for me in the comments there, guys. Okay, that uh I I definitely support pay rise for nurses.
Speaker 1:Um the yeah, no, no, you're calling for further negotiations with trade unions. Thank you, Chancellor. I will I will relay that message to the trade unions. So the trade unions have just told me that they are exceptionally dissatisfied with that answer, and they are accusing you of not listening to them. And they say that the strikes are on. And I regret them for you. A day has now passed and the general strike has begun. Oh wow, okay. And a week has now passed, and I'm afraid that rubbish is gathering in the streets, I'm afraid that schools are closing, I'm afraid that many NHS appointments are being cancelled, and your poll ratings are really suffering. I'm calling for the trade unions to negotiate more with you, and they are continuing to say no. And now I'm afraid to say that I have a phone call for you, and that call is from the Prime Minister herself. And I have to warn you that the Prime Minister is not happy with these developments. Yeah. And indeed, the Prime Minister has told me that she is going to overrule you. And so she wants the strikes to end immediately. And so I'm going to call the trade units back in here and we're going to end these strikes. And you're going to offer them 8%, you're going to offer them 9%. They're still saying no. I'm afraid we have to settle them at 10% on the orders of the Prime Minister. Okay. So alas, you've lost 10 billion pounds, and indeed your approval rating has gone down. It's gone down. Because the public blame you for they blame the unions as well, but they blame you for orchestrating this scenario by not settling matters earlier. And alas, you're you've taken a hit in the polls. Yeah. So I'm sorry to end on that downer, Sammy, but welcome to the world of being Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Speaker:I think what I would have done in that instance is I would have gone on the counter-offensive in the press. So I would have gone out and explained the decisions and said, look, if you we'd have done this and we'd have got eight percent, then that means that X, Y, and Z bridge and road fixes or New Town Centre and Western Supermare doesn't get built. And I like it. Proactive media things, yeah. Yeah, I would have gone on the counter-offensive, which would probably have annoyed the Prime Minister even further. So but uh it is interesting. Because you know, you've got the surplus there, you just say, well, we've got the money, we'll spend it. But actually, you do need to think about infrastructure, you do need to think about the previous uh things. You need if a COVID pandemic hits, you have to have that in place. And so you're balancing thoughts and decisions there, especially with like overinflated wages in the public sector. And these are all like racking around my brain in there. But I can imagine Rachel Reeves's decision book is like this. And so that this is me doing it in a two-minute thing. I failed miserably in the public eye and probably lost myself a job.
Speaker 1:Well, that's it. Many years to go until the election. If you read the book, there are many more scenarios where you can recover your position and get more money and get more popular.
Speaker:Oh, thanks for doing that.
Speaker 1:Great sport. Thank you so much for being our chancellor. It's uh it's a hard old job, and you do it with a lot of people. I lost it, I lost it a week.
unknown:No, no, no, no.
Speaker:But so after this, within the book, so let's say that they are the first two uh scenarios that we do. Um, there are many more that we go through in examples. And how does how does how do you work out whether you are the chancellor at the end of it or whether the public likes you or not?
Speaker 1:Yeah, so as you're going through the book, like we've just done, you will get feedback on your decisions in terms of the polls will move, your popularity rating will change. You have a popular uh an approval rating which goes up and down throughout the book, and you have a the budget surplus figure we've been talking about. And basically, you've got to be beware. If your budget surplus gets too low, markets will start looking at you and being like, what's going on over there? And also if your approval rating gets too low, you risk the Prime Minister being like, well, we might need to change. Chancellor here. And it builds up to a budget. Yeah, and you get to build your own budget. There's a scorecard where you pick all the different measures you want, and then that's the kind of the big finale. And then you'll see how your budget's received, and then there's a general election a few weeks later, and you'll find out whether you did enough to stay in power.
Speaker:So this feels cool. Like it feels like sort of like a semi-like board game that you sort of play to try and stay afloat and see what you would do. And like that gives you a real insight to the levels of decisions that are being made.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I think that when I was writing it, and even before I write it, before I wrote it, I wanted to answer the question what does it feel like to be Chancellor? As in, can I recreate the stress and the tension? I can't tell you, honestly. Like I went.
Speaker:Hands went clammy. Like, yeah, yeah, yeah. Because you're like responsibility, all of these people are gonna suffer.
Speaker 1:I mean, like there are 60 million people in the UK. So when you're the Chancellor, many people's lives are in your hands, right? Like it's of course it's a huge, huge thing. Um yeah, I like I said, I wanted to make that feeling of yeah, tension and stress. And I think that when you read the book, because you know that something is coming up, a decision where something is important, it's on the line. I think you end up reading the book more closely than you might read other books because you become, I hope, kind of invested in what's about to happen. And so you're kind of like, Well, I really want to make sure I get this right, and then you kind of lock in. So I think that's also hopefully then the economic concepts in the book will stick even more because you're so in the zone about being chancellor. That's my hope.
Speaker:What you what I felt there was that you have to make a bad decision.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I think that you'll you'll find, and this is what's true as chancellor, there's a decision, it'll be bad. The alternative would have been even worse. You do the bad decision, everyone's like, you made a bad decision. It's like, yeah, but the alternative would have been worse, right? And then as so many of those choices occur in politics, and everyone criticizing you for making the bad call, but it might have been generally the best call on offered to you. I think that that's a that's a pretty common occurrence, right? And I think I think that book, this book will really impress that on readers. It's so much fun.
Speaker:Like I'm glad, I'm glad that was just great. Like it's just cool because uh immediately I'm like, okay, well, I've got this to play with now, I've got to do this, got to balance the books here. Don't do that, do this. This is gonna be perception-based, and you're suddenly playing with all of these thoughts. And so it gives a real insight of like what actually must be happening there. And yeah, I would love to know, like, from you. So you've mentioned obviously that the goal of what you want to people to get out of it. What did you get out of it by doing it? What was different for you, like by putting these scenarios and processes together?
Speaker 1:Um, I think one big thing was sympathy. Like, I was like, wow, this is really quite hard. And looking at the exact numbers the chancellor working with, like the low billions they're often dealing with. Yeah, I came away thinking it's actually really hard to be Chancellor, and we probably don't give them as much slack as we might. And from the interviews as well, I really got that. And just from a personal learning exercise, the amount I was able to, just from my own understanding, get from interviewing the chancellors was huge. And funny things, like Jeremy Hunt told me that before you give a budget in 24 hours, 48 hours before, you go see the king, you go see the monarch, and you tell them the entire budget. I thought this is an amazing fact, right? Because we're all like, what's mean the budget? As a journalist, my job is to break news on what the big budget measures are. And the king just finds out like two days before everyone else. I was like, wow, that is just unbelievable. Insider intel that the king gets before. I didn't know that. I know, it's absolutely amazing. Um, so it's just facts like that I thought were just really fun. Um, I learned that income tax was brought in in the late 18th century as a temporary measure to fund a war. It was meant to be just temporary. But then obviously now income tax is like the biggest earner, it's the most kind of permanent tax we have. Yeah. And also, I was able to do a tour of number 11 Downing Street, and there's a really interesting staircase in Downing Street where chancers get to pick a cartoon from their time. So everyone, every chancer gets their own little cartoon for their legacy, you know, what they want to be remembered as. So it's really cool seeing all the different um cartoons. You had Gordon Brown handing out cash to public sector workers, you had George Osborne being crushed by an elephant called debt, you know what I mean? Like see, that was his big thing he had to manage. Yeah. So um just fun, really nice colour like that. What is quasi? I'd love to know. I actually couldn't see one for quasi. Maybe I've got that wrong, but I don't remember what he picked. He might have been not there long enough. I don't know. When he comes in, you have to ask him, did you pick a cartoon and were you allowed to? I know that Nadim Zahawi has a cartoon. He was chanced off like two or three days or something like that. Yeah, well no, sorry, longer than that, but he was there not a long time at all. His his his cartoon is him holding up Boris Johnson as if Doris Johnson is the budget box, right? Because you've seen that by Zahawi coming in and uh kind of that was the end of Boris, right? Like that was right at the very, very end. Yeah. Um so just being able to do things like that. It was an amazing experience of research doing the book.
Speaker:Yeah. What's it like in there? Is it is it like beautiful and or is it quite like corporate feeling? What's the feeling?
Speaker 1:Yeah, I mean, Downing Number 11 Downing Street is a quaint old Georgian house, really. And you do feel like you've kind of walked into someone's house rather than like a business or any kind of government department. And it's always a question for chancellors. Do you prefer to work from number 11 or do you write rather work from the treasury? Often they split split between the two, but you can see why you'd like to work from number 11. It feels really cool. There's a really lovely study with all these old copies of Hansard around the around the walls and downstreet gardens just behind you. And I remember when I was in the state dining room, so state drawing room, which was on the first floor, lovely carpet, like very beautiful room. But actually a lot of the refurbishment was done by paid for by Rishi Sunak. Uh, because you know, we in the UK don't like to spend money on like public buildings or anything like that. So out of his personal pocket, he'd he'd financed you know a lot of the kind of restoration of the room. So yeah, no, it's it's a beautiful place, 11 Dynastry.
Speaker:Oh, so interesting. I'd love to know who your favourite Chancellor was that you interviewed.
Speaker 1:Um I think purely from kind of like a historic coolness experience. I did really enjoy speaking to Norman Lamont, who was Chancellor, as I mentioned, in the currency crisis. And he gave me why was my favourite quote about kind of being Chancellor. And when he said it, I actually didn't understand what it meant. And he said this: he said, obloquy is a necessary part of true glory for a politician. And wait, I was like, I don't know what obloquy means. I didn't say that at the time. I was like, what is obloquy? I thought you should be able to do that. It's from an Edmund Burke quote. And obloquy means to go through a period of significant public shame or humiliation in your life. And so basically what he's saying is that to be a truly great politician, you have to go through a time where you're kind of vilified by the public, but then you are ultimately vindicated by events and you kind of emerge like as a hero at the end. But you have to go through that journey of and I think that really sums up what it must be like to be a successful chancellor, because you probably do end up doing some unpopular stuff that will bear fruit in the future, but you take the hit at the time, everyone hates you, but then turns out actually you were kind of right all along and it did help the economy, and then everyone turned out great, and then you win the election, right? That's like the dream uh character arc for a chancellor. I think he really summed it up in in that quote. So yeah, I think I'll go I'll go Norman. It's quite church-esque, isn't it? It is, it's very church-lesque, I think. Yeah. Let'll be dark times. Yeah. I mean, Rachel Reeves, for example, now at the pits of unpopularity, right? But I think she could get it right. Well, that's it, we don't know, do we? The economy could go gangbusters in the next few years, and suddenly Labour will look like you know masters of the craft, and you can see Labour winning the next election if it's suddenly turned around significantly. Um I think actually Rachel Reeves.
Speaker:Everyone bangs on and goes, oh it won't, no, it won't. But they're the ones that I'm like, do you know like you know?
Speaker 1:It's like George Osborne's really good case study here because obviously he became Chancellor in 2010 when the Cassotters won the election. He gave his worst budget in 2012, the Omni Shambles budget. He was booed at the London Olympics, you might remember. And then obviously the Tories won the 2015 general election. So Oswald managed it, right? Oswald managed to go from public figure who was really disliked to leading being a chancellor in a govern in a government that won re-election. So Reeves is, I guess, is hoping to do the same kind of U-shaped career journey, right? That's what she needs to happen to for Labour to stay in power.
Speaker:It is, it is like a crazy time. And and that they've got a general election in 29.
Speaker 1:That's when it's due next, yeah.
Speaker:Can it happen before that?
Speaker 1:Uh I think it can, yes. A no-confidence vote in the governments. Um things all fall apart, but that is the next schedule election. Yeah.
Speaker:So I'd love to know then who you feel like you've obviously done a lot of research on chancellors over the years, perhaps ones that you didn't interview because you know them personally now. But like for you looking back, like who who do you feel like was the most, like the worst one in your your opinion, that had not a U-shape, maybe just a straight slalom down.
Speaker 1:I mean, I know you've got him coming on. I'm sure he won't mind me saying this, but on the record it of what happened, you have to say it's quasi, right? In terms of like you know, time spent in office and how quickly things went south. I think that you'd have to say quasi is probably of recent times one of the worst. I think in his defense, he argues that some of that or much of what happened was driven by the Prime Minister. It was driven by Liz Truss at the time, wanting to go very quick with these measures. As I talked about how, you know, if they'd gone slower, it could have worked. So he puts a lot of the blame at the at the door of the Prime Minister. So I think kind of. I'd wait to ask him that question. Well, yeah, it would be great. I'm sure he'll happily tell you in like it'll give you chapter and verse on what it was like.
Speaker:And many would argue Gordon Brown as well, as a chancellor that had made some very questionable decisions, which later now we can come to see haven't panned out too well. The sale of the gold reserves, etc., and uh how much that's potentially worth to the British economy these days is quite nuts. Um, but you wouldn't he wouldn't have known that at the time, and he did need to have some headroom.
Speaker 1:Yeah, and I mean, someone like Gordon Brown, clearly, he was Chancellor during a period where the economy did well, right? Between 1997 and the financial crash, the economy did well, and it's kind of it was always a question of how much of that was kind of global favorable tailwinds and how much of it was astute management of the economy by the Labour governments. I think that my sense is that Gordon Brown's legacy is fairly strong, especially his role in the financial crisis in terms of managing the aftermath. I think that world leaders like widely credit Gordon Brown as being and he was prime minister at that time, right? He was widely being one of the most influential and important figures in stabilizing that situation and coming up with a financial package that if had not been in place, could have we could have seen real like social disorder and and harm if that hadn't happened. So I think you have to give Gordon Brown a lot of credit for that.
Speaker:Agreed. There's certain things he did well, certain things I don't think he did well, and the the thing is that everybody picks out those. For sure, for sure. It's just a waste of way. Oh, for sure. Especially with politicians. That's what the press latch on to, and certainly social media when they find these stories, it's crazy. Um What's the big takeaway then? As Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a very, very difficult role. We know that. But what's the big takeaway that we want the audience to go and like read the book and understand from that moment?
Speaker 1:I think the big takeaway is that there's always a huge trade-off in most decisions that you're making as Chancellor between the economics and the politics. So what might be nice politically probably has a significant economic cost, and what would be nice economically probably has a short-term political cost. And so if the government does something that you think's questionable, it's probably they're probably doing it for an economic reason. And if they're doing something that you really like, you should ask yourself, wait, what's the cost of that? So I think that's really the big thing. I think the other big thing, and this came through in an interview with Jeremy Hunt, was that the best chancellors are able to do things in government that will only bear fruits in say five, 10, 15 years' time, but they do them nevertheless, even if it means that in the short term they as chancellors become more unpopular and so on. That's a real legacy play as a chancellor, right? Where you do something, it's like planting the seeds for a tree and you'll never see that tree grow, but future generations will. I think that if you're able to do that, then future then history will look back on you very fondly as a as a chancellor. Um that's kind of peak goals as chancellor.
Speaker:Which is tough because, like, as we well know, that they are trying to keep their own constituency. So, you know, that's extremely difficult. So they've got to like manage that on that side and then also do the thing which is gonna grow in 10 years. Like we we had Andrew Craig on, and he was talking about a policy change, for example, giving every child £5,000 at birth into a you know a small and medium cap-invested uh sort of child Aisher. Yeah. And actually, when you look at the numbers, if it were to continue performing at the reasonable rates, it's a decision which massively benefits an enormous amount of people over a you know a period of 10, 15 years from now, plus the actual revenues it would create for the government. But it's very difficult for a chancellor to go, yeah, let's do that. That's great. You know, it's only three billion in there. But you know, how how are you going to justify not building the road in Northampton? Um and that's that's exactly it. That's exactly it, right? Yeah. So we've got these decisions to make. Joe, I've absolutely loved this. Oh, thanks. Thank you. Go and grab the book. We'll leave a description uh link in the description below. Um, it's a lot of fun, and and you know, I have been tucking into it a little bit with my partner, and we were doing a few of the scenarios last night, and it was great fun.
Speaker 1:It's fun to play with someone else, like to question your decisions.
Speaker:It's great to play with a partner. Um, and you just get a real big insight. Like I you walk away with these like feelings that you're like, and like weirdly, I went out the back and I'm with the dog at the end, and I was like, I'm an awful human being.
Speaker 2:What choices did I make? And why? Yeah.
Speaker:I felt responsible at those points. But I think it's good to step into the shoes because you can get into this rut of being swayed by sorry, by I know you're a journalist yourself, but the press and the left, the right press, or social media left and right, and these things can really take a big sort of impact on the way that you see the world. And actually understanding all of the cards in play can actually make you a better person and just being able to make informed decisions for yourself and think critically about these things.
Speaker 1:I guess that's absolutely brilliantly put. I literally couldn't say it better myself. I think it's so easy to criticize as well, especially public figures. But like you say, if you've if you understand the full picture of what the options were, then you can criticize, but make sure, yeah, it's great to be in the position of kind of in informedness and then and then yes, we can critique, but it's it's so hard, uh as you as you described.
Speaker:Absolutely. Joe, thank you.
Speaker 1:Thank you, Sammy. Thank you.
Speaker:See you soon.
Speaker 1:See you soon.
